

3 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Product Review Division

SUBJECT: MPRRD Comments on the RONI

REFERENCE: [] to C/PRD, 24 February 1975 with [] to
[] 24 February attached

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You asked me to explain [] recommendations for the RONI,
which he has put under "additional points."

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--"account for all published articles"

i.e., not just those falling under a NIO area of responsibility

--"accommodate double counting"

i.e., eliminate it

--"standardize 'sources' (suggest using KEP 'collection methods'
and examine CIA's PSS methodology"i.e., use a more detailed specification of sources, e.g.,
high-resolution PHOTINT, low-resolution PHOTINT, etc.

--"assess the real need for daily review of production"

i.e., consider reviewing daily publications for perhaps
one or two months a year instead of 365 days a year.

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2/24/75

Dick:

We've looked over the RONI and I
pass on the attached comments for your
consideration.

I suspect that, even if you should
agree that some of the ideas are worthy,
they may be somewhat premature for now.
But maybe we could see them as something
for the not too distant future?

cc: Wilson
Clarke



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24 February 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Comments on the RONI

1. I have examined the December/January RONI and the November prototype RONI and conclude that the data can be used to relate production to the KIQs. As a supplement to the KEP-derived data on KIQ-related production, the RONI data will add a useful dimension to analyzing the qualitative relationship between IC products and KIQs.

2. Overall, I believe the RONI is organized well and put together so that the reader interested in a particular aspect can get quickly into the subject that interests him. There is no question that such a periodical reflecting the results of actual product review will prove useful in product improvement.

3. The statistical data on the number of articles by publication, the number of articles by area/topic, the principal collection sources and the KIQ relationship of the articles are of value, but there should be some effort given to presenting interrelated data. For example, there should be a way of identifying what sources contributed information on articles which were KIQ related.

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4. Based on the data in the RONI, the table below shows that 67% of the articles published were either "significantly" or "peripherally" related to the KIQs. The data in the RONI on number of articles and KIQ relationship can be displayed by individual area(s)/topic(s).

<u>KIQ RELATIONSHIP</u>	<u>NOVEMBER RONI</u>	<u>DEC/JAN. RONI</u>
SIGNIFICANT	228	668
PERIPHERAL	474	803
NONE	347	725
TOTAL ARTICLES	1,049	2,196

-67% of
total

-67% of
total

The KIQ-related data is useful, not only for quantifying production against the KIQs, but also in establishing a "degree of importance" with respect to each article's relationship to the KIQs. A general statement of the meaning of "SIGNIFICANT," "PERIPHERAL" and "NONE" is desirable from a methodological viewpoint.

5. The following matrix added to the RONI would aid in refining the assessment of KIQ-related articles. The meaning of the terms used to describe "product utility" should be included. The product utility data would probably result in some spirited Community feedback.

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KIQ RELATIONSHIP/PRODUCT UTILITY 1/

ALL (149) NIB,

NID and DIN Articles

KIQ NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 30

		KIQ RELATIONSHIP			
		SIGNIFICANT	PERIPHERAL	NONE	TOTAL
PRODUCT UTILITY	Major Value	7	0	0	7
	Worth Reporting	31	31	6	68
	Marginal	1	43	9	53
	Filler	0	6	15	21
	TOTAL	39	80	30	149

1/ Data obtained from November PRD work sheets for the USSR, E. Europe.


Analysis of the data in the matrix shows that of the 149 articles, 39 were considered significantly related to the seven KIQs. The remaining articles were either peripherally related or not related to the KIQs. Of the 39 articles significantly related to the KIQs, seven were judged to be of major value and 31 were worth reporting. The "utility" of the remaining article was marginal. Thus, of the 119 articles which were significantly and peripherally related to the seven KIQs, only seven articles (or 5%) were judged to be of major value, and 62 were worth reporting.

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6. These additional points should be considered:



- account for all published articles,
- accommodate double counting,
- standardize "sources" (suggest using KEP
"collection methods" and examine CIA's
PSS methodology), and
- assess the real need for daily review of
production.



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Distribution:

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- 1 - 
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- 1 - R&A Reading
- 1 - R&A Subject
- 1 - DJQ chrono

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28 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: USIB Response to the RONI

1. The USIB met on 28 February and addressed, inter alia, their views on the RONI. The discussion was informative and lively. However, the amount of guidance provided as a result of the conversation was limited.

-- General Wilson opened the discussion by requesting comments on three subjects: (a) Does the RONI serve a worthwhile purpose? (b) Are there any specific, detailed comments concerning the RONI? (c) What kind of dissemination should the RONI have?

-- General Tighe of DIA initiated the comments by saying that he thought it was "a very useful product. It is the first time we have had critical comment. We would only suggest that it be even more critical in the future."

-- Brigadier General Pustay, AFNIN, commented "it was a very useful product for looking at ourselves." He did note, however, that the RONI draft may not have sufficiently focused upon "middle level officials in government." He noted that middle level managers may find some products useful which are critically remarked upon in the RONI.

-- Mr. Packman of INR recommended that there be increased identification of who, specifically, the RONI "reviewers" are.

-- Ed Proctor seconded this motion. He expanded on this theme by saying that he thought the geographic and topical reviews should be "vetted" to the NIOs responsible, as only they (the NIOs) can add the views of the consumer. By providing this review they might explain why some unusual emphases appear in various national products. Proctor also addressed the issue of redundancy noting that each publication is designed for a certain level of audience. Therefore, while it may look repetitive, it is not, because most of the consumers get only one of these products. It was his view that

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not
we (PRD) should look at each product in terms of overlap, but more in terms of the specific audience.

-- Bill Morell of Treasury agreed with what Proctor had said and noted, "one of the biggest weaknesses in our intelligence analysis is our incestuous critiques." In his view the present draft RONI is too self-congratulatory. Morell's view is that daily products are badly in need of overhaul if they are to meet current needs. He made critical reference to what appears in newspapers versus what appears in the NID.

-- Discussion began to get off track at this point, and the conferees stopped talking about the RONI and started defending or attacking current intelligence products. Proctor responded to Morell by noting that intelligence products are designed for all, and, therefore, for no one specifically and if he (Morell) was looking for a product for the top four executives at Treasury, he was looking in the wrong place. It was Proctor's understanding that the reason for an intelligence staff at Treasury was to "tailor" products for that specific top staff audience. Proctor also noted that national intelligence products were not in competition with the public press, stating, "to be first is often to be wrong."

-- General Walters attempted to return the conversation to its original purpose, i.e., the RONI. However, he did say that he was not aware that many shared the view that the NID was that far short of the mark.

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on to a different subject. He hoped that the Product Review Division did not limit itself to the NIB, NID, and DIN in the future, in order to get a better view of the effectiveness of the community performance.

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-- [redacted] interjected a remark at this point, that this was exactly what we intend to do.

-- Ed Proctor was the only one who addressed the subject of the audience for disseminating the RONI. He said that he thought that the recipients for the "next edition or two" should be the same small group as for the RONI draft.

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-- There was no direct response by anyone to Proctor's suggestion. However, General Wilson did note that the emphasis and intent of the RONI has always been to be remedial rather than pejorative. [redacted] again spoke and wondered if the RONI

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was sometimes criticizing requirements rather than product. He referred to the critical remark concerning missile reporting as a case in point. Mr. Proctor responded by saying that he knew of no standing requirement to report anything on that subject specifically. And General Walters opined that regardless, the RONI's raising of this subject points up the problem.

2. In summary, setting aside the Morell-Proctor contretemps, the RONI got a good report card from USIB. My understanding is (a) that the USIB finds the RONI worthwhile, (b) that it could be even more critical than the RONI draft they have reviewed, (c) that it would not hurt for the NIOs to look over their sections and (d) that we have carte blanche to expand our review of products in almost any direction we wish.




Colonel, USMC

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